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Abstract. The first practical identity based encryption (IBE) scheme
was proposed by Boneh and Franklin in [BF03]. In this work we point
out that there is a flawed step in the security reduction exhibited by the
authors. Fortunately, it is possible to fix it without changing the scheme
or the underlying assumption.
In the second place, we introduce a variant of the seminal IBE scheme
which allows a more efficient security reduction. The new scheme is sim-
pler, and has more compact ciphertexts than Boneh-Franklin’s proposal,
while keeping the computational cost.
Finally, we observe that the flawed step pointed out here is present in
several works, and that our techniques can be applied to obtain tighter
reductions for previous relevant schemes.
Keywords: provable security, identity-based encryption, exact security, bilinear
maps.
1 Introduction
The concept of Identity Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed by Shamir in
[Sha85], aimed at simplifying certificate management in e-mail related systems.
The idea is that an arbitrary string such as an e-mail address or a telephone
number could serve as a public key for an encryption scheme. Once a user U
receives a communication encrypted using its identity IDU , the user authenticates
itself to a Private Key Generation Center (KGC) from which it obtains the
corresponding private key dIDU .
The problem was not satisfactorily solved until the work by Boneh and
Franklin [BF03]. They proposed formal security notions for IBE systems and
designed a fully functional secure IBE scheme using bilinear maps. The security
is based on a variant of the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, called
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. This scheme and the tools developed in its
design have been successfully applied in numerous cryptographic settings, tran-
scending by far the identity based cryptography framework.
On the other hand, an important concern when exhibiting a security reduc-
tionist proof is that of the efficiency of the reduction. One of the goals pursued
is to preserve as much as possible the strength of the underlying hard problem
which is used in the protocol’s design. An inefficient security reduction would
imply the use of larger key sizes to attain a given security level.
Our contributions. In the first place, we show there is a flawed step in the
security reduction exhibited in [BF03] for the scheme proposed for chosen ci-
phertext security. Fortunately, the reduction can be changed without modifying
the original scheme or the underlying hard problem used to state the security.
The efficiency of the new security reduction is a bit worse than the previous one.
This is just another example in which a well-known and widely used construction
turns out to have an unnoticed flawed security reduction.
In the second place, we modify the scheme by Boneh and Franklin towards
obtaining a more efficient security reduction. Indeed, it is possible to show a
tighter security reduction for a modified scheme which uses one less random or-
acle. The new proposal also presents more compact ciphertexts than the original
scheme.
Finally, since Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme has been used as a building block
for numerous protocols, the corrections and improvements we present here are
likely to be applied to further schemes. For instance, this is the case for the
schemes in [GS02,HL02,Gen03,AP03,YFDL04,CC05].
2 Preliminaries
We begin by fixing some notation. If A is a non-empty set, then x← A denotes
that x has been uniformly chosen in A. If A is a finite set, then |A| denotes its
cardinality.
2.1 Definitions for IBE schemes
Identity based encryption (IBE). An IBE is specified by four probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) algorithms:
Setup takes a security parameter 1` and returns the system parameters params
and master-key. The system parameters include the description of setsM, C,
which denote the set of messages and ciphertexts respectively. params is
publicly available, while the master-key is kept secret by the KGC.
Extract takes as inputs params, master-key and an arbitrary string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗
and returns a private key dID to the user with identity ID. This must be
done over a secure channel, since dID enables to decrypt ciphertexts under
the identity ID.
Encrypt takes as inputs params, ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ andM ∈M. It returns a cipher-
text C ∈ C.
Decrypt takes as inputs params, C ∈ C and a private key dID, and it returns
M ∈M or rejects.
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Chosen ciphertext security. An IBE scheme is said to have indistinguisha-
bility against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-CCA) if any PPT
algorithm A has a negligible advantage in the following game:
Setup The challenger takes a security parameter 1` and runs the Setup algo-
rithm. It gives params to the adversary. It keeps the master-key to itself.
Phase 1 The adversary issues queries of the form
– Extraction query 〈IDi〉. The challenger runs algorithm Extract to generate
the private key di corresponding to IDi. It sends di to the adversary.
– Decryption query 〈IDi, Ci〉. The challenger generates the private key di.
It then runs Decrypt to decrypt Ci under IDi.
These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query may depend on
the answers obtained to the previous queries.
Challenge The adversary outputs equal length plaintexts M0,M1 ∈ M and
an identity IDch. The only constraint is that the private key for IDch was
not requested in Phase 1. The challenger picks β ← {0, 1} and sets C =
Encrypt(params, IDch,Mβ). It sends C to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary issues extraction and decryption queries as in Phase 1,
with the restriction 〈IDi〉 6= 〈IDch〉 and 〈IDi, Ci〉 6= 〈IDch, C〉.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Such an adversary is called an IND-ID-CCA adversary A, and its advantage
is defined as AdvCCAE,A (1
`) = |Pr[β = β′]− 1/2| .
Similarly, indistinguishability against passive adversaries (IND-ID-CPA) can also
be defined. In this case, the game between the challenger and the adversary is
similar to the IND-ID-CCA case, but disallowing decryption queries. The advan-
tage of an adversary in this game is defined as AdvCPAE,A(1
`) = |Pr[β = β′]− 1/2| .
Definition 1. An IBE system E is secure under chosen ciphertext attacks (resp.
chosen plaintext attacks) if for any probabilistic polynomial time IND-ID-CCA
(resp. IND-ID-CPA) adversary A the function AdvCCAE,A (1`) (resp. AdvCPAE,A(1`)) is
negligible.
2.2 Bilinear maps and bilinear groups
Let G1,G2 and GT be finite abelian groups in which the discrete logarithm is
believed to be hard. We use additive notation for G1,G2 whereas multiplicative
notation is used for GT . Thus, G∗1 = G1 \ {O1} and G∗T = GT \ {1T }, where
O1 and 1T are the identity elements in G1 and GT respectively. By a pairing or
bilinear map we will refer to a non-degenerate bilinear function ê : G1×G2 → GT .
In some protocols the existence of a computable isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 is
assumed. In particular, this implies that ψ(aP2) = aψ(P2). By a bilinear group
we refer to a tuple (G1,G2,GT , ê, ψ) with the properties described above.
Bilinear maps are usually implemented using the Weil or modified Tate pair-
ings on an elliptic curve. In general, the elements in G1 allow more compact
representation than those in G2. In the following it is assumed that |G1| =
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|G2| = |GT | = p, where p is prime; G1,G2 are cyclic groups generated by P1, P2
respectively and ψ(P2) = P1. In this context, the map ê is non-degenerate if and
only if ê(P1, P2) 6= 1GT . We refer to [BF03] for further details.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem on (G1,G2). Given aP2, bP2 ∈ G∗2
and cP1 ∈ G∗1, where P2 ← G∗2, P1 = ψ(P2), a, b, c ← Z∗p; compute W =
ê(P1, P2)abc ∈ GT .
We say that an algorithm B (t, ε) breaks BDH on (G1,G2) if it runs in time at
most t and has advantage at least ε, that is,
Pr[B(P2, aP2, bP2, cP1) = ê(P1, P2)abc)] ≥ ε,
where the probability is taken over the random choices of the parameters, and
the random bits of B.
Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) Problem on (G1,G2). Let
aP2, bP2 ∈ G∗2, cP1 ∈ G∗1, and T ← GT , where P2 ← G∗2, P1 = ψ(P2), a, b, c ←
Z∗p. We say that an algorithm B (t, ε) breaks BDDH on (G1,G2) if it runs in
time at most t and∣∣Pr[B(P2, aP2, bP2, cP1, ê(P1, P2)abc) = 1]− Pr[B(P2, aP2, bP2, cP1, T ) = 1]∣∣ ≥ ε,
where the probability is computed over the random choices of the parameters,
and the random bits of B. Hereafter, the distribution on the left side is called
BDH distribution and is denoted by PBDH , while the distribution on the right
is called random BDH distribution and is denoted by RBDH .
3 Security proof of Boneh-Franklin identity based
encryption scheme revisited
In this section we consider the identity based encryption (IBE) scheme by Boneh
and Franklin [BF03]. In the first place, we point out and fix a flaw in the security
reduction given by the authors. In repairing the proof, we do not need to change
the security assumption neither the specification of the scheme. However, the
security reduction is a bit worse than the original one.
3.1 Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme
We will not directly use the original description of the BF scheme, because it
is phrased with bilinear group pairs where G1 = G2, so we must adapt their
scheme to the more general case G1 6= G2. In choosing how to use G1 and G2,
we preferred to minimize the length of the ciphertexts. This means we use G2 as
the set of private keys and then ciphertexts are elements in G∗1 × {0, 1}n. Here
follows the description of the BF scheme, which is called Full-Ident in [BF03].
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Full-Ident
Setup. Let (G1,G2, GT , be, ψ) a bilinear group. Choose a gen-
erator P2 ← G2 and set P1 = ψ(P2). Next pick s ← Z∗p
and set Qpub = sP2 ∈ G∗2, Ppub = sP1 ∈ G∗1. Choose crypto-
graphic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗2, H2 : GT → {0, 1}n,
H3 : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → Z∗p, H4 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The message space
isM = {0, 1}n and the ciphertext space is C = G∗1 × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
Extract. For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute QID = H1(ID) ∈ G∗2
and set the private key dID to be dID = sQID ∈ G∗2.
Encrypt. To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}n under identity ID, compute QID =
H1(ID) ∈ G∗2, choose σ ← {0, 1}n, set r = H3(σ,M) ∈ Z∗p and finally
C = 〈rP1, σ ⊕H2(grID),M ⊕H4(σ)〉 where gID = be(Ppub, QID) ∈ GT .
Decrypt. Let C = 〈U, V,W 〉 ∈ C be a ciphertext under the identity
ID. To decrypt C using the private key dID ∈ G∗2 do:
1. Compute V ⊕H2(be(U, dID)) = σ.
2. Compute W ⊕H4(σ) =M.
3. Set r = H3(σ,M). Check that U = rP. If not, reject the ciphertext.
4. Output M .
This completes the description of Full-Ident. This IBE scheme is sound since
ê(U, dID) = ê(rP1, sQID) = ê(P1, QID)sr = ê(Ppub, QID)r = grID.
In [BF03] it is proven that the above scheme is IND-ID-CCA secure under
the BDH assumption in the Random Oracle model. That scheme uses Fujisaki
and Okamoto transformation [FO99] from a one-way encryption scheme into an
IND-CCA encryption scheme in the ROM (we refer to [BDPR98] for public key
encryption security notions). If we denote by Epk(M, r) the encryption of M
using the random bits r under the public key pk, the transformation by Fujisaki
and Okamoto is the hybrid scheme1
Ehypk (M) = 〈Epk(σ,H3(σ,M)),H4(σ)⊕M〉 (1)
where σ is random and H3,H4 are random oracles. To decrypt (C1, C2), one
first obtains σ′ decrypting C1 using the original scheme, next computes M ′ and
finally checks if Epk(σ′,H3(σ′,M)) = C1. If this is so, outputs M ; otherwise
outputs reject.
Two additional schemes are needed in order to exhibit the security proof in
[BF03]. These schemes are not IBE schemes but merely public key encryption
schemes. They are called BasicPub and BasicPubhy. Here follows the description
of
1 In the case where the symmetric encryption scheme is the one-time pad.
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BasicPub
KeyGen. Let (G1,G2, GT , be, ψ) a bilinear group. Choose a generator
P2 ← G2 and set P1 = ψ(P2). Next pick s ← Z∗p, Q ← G∗2 and set
Qpub = sP2 ∈ G∗2, Ppub = sP1 ∈ G∗1. Choose H2 : GT → {0, 1}n. Then
M = {0, 1}n and C = G∗1 × {0, 1}n. The public key is
pk = 〈p,G1,G2,GT , be, P1, P2, Ppub, Qpub, Q,H2〉.
The private key is sk = d = sQ ∈ G∗2.
Encrypt. To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}n choose r ← Z∗p and set the cipher-
text to be
C = 〈rP1,M ⊕H2(gr)〉 where g = be(Ppub, Q) ∈ GT
Decrypt. Let C = 〈U, V 〉 ∈ C be a ciphertext under the public
key pk. To decrypt C using the private key d ∈ G∗2, compute
V ⊕H2(be(U, d)) =M.
Finally, the scheme BasicPubhy is the result of applying Fujisaki-Okamoto
transformation (1) to the above scheme. The security reduction for Full-Ident
scheme under the BDH assumption follows the diagram below
Full-Ident BasicPubhy BasicPub BDH
A1(t1, ε1) A2(t2, ε2) A3(t3, ε3) B(t′, ε′)-Res 1
pppppp
ppp6
-Res 2
pppppp
ppp6
-Res 3
pppppp
ppp6
pppppp
ppp6
The following results are shown in [BF03]. Hereafter, qE , qD, qHi denote the
number of extraction, decryption and random oracle Hi queries respectively.
Result 1 Let A1 an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has advantage ε2 against Full-Ident
making at most qE , qD and qH1 queries. Then there is an IND-CCA adversary A2
that has advantage at least ε1e(1+qE+qD) against BasicPub
hy. Its running time is
t2 ≤ t1+ cG2(qD+ qH1 + qE), where cG2 denotes the time of computing a random
multiple in G2.
Result 2 Let A2 an IND-CCA adversary that has advantage ε2 against BasicPubhy
making at most qD, qH3 and qH4 queries. Then there is an IND-CPA adversary A3
that has advantage at least 12(qH3+qH4 ) [(ε2+1)(1− 2/p)
qD − 1] against BasicPub.
Its running time is t3 ≤ t2 +O((qH3 + qH4) · (n+ log p)).
Result 3 Let A3 an IND-CPA adversary that has advantage ε3 against BasicPub
making at most qH2 queries. Then there is an algorithm B breaking the BDH
problem on (G1,G2) with advantage at least
2ε3
qH2
and running time t′ ≈ t3.
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In order to come up with the total concrete security, we can bound any qHi
with a single qH , and assume that qE = qD, since extraction and decryption
operations have roughly the same computational complexity. Then, taking the
above reductions, we obtain that the BF scheme is (t1, qH , qD, ε1) IND-ID-CCA
secure if the BDH problem on (G1,G2) is(
t1 + cG1(2qD + qH)) + 2qH(n+ log p),
ε1
8eq2HqD
)
-secure. (2)
Therefore, the security reduction is far from tight, mainly because of the q2HqD
factor relating the advantages against the scheme and the underlying problem.
3.2 A flaw in the security reduction
In this section we point out a flaw in the reduction used to state Result 1, which
is Lemma 4.6 in [BF03].
The goal of that reduction is to construct an IND-CCA adversary B with ad-
vantage ε/e(1+ qE + qD) against BasicPubhy by using an IND-ID-CCA adversary
A with advantage ε against Full-Ident. B receives a public key
Kpub = 〈p,G1,G2,GT , ê, P1, P2, Ppub, Q,Qpub,H2,H3,H4〉
from its challenger. Then B simulates the challenger for A as follows:
Setup B givesA the parameters 〈p,G1,G2,GT , ê, P1, P2, Ppub, Qpub,H1,H2,H3,H4〉,
where H1 is an oracle controlled by B as indicated in the following:
H1-queries To respond to A queries, algorithm B maintains a list H list1 of tuples
〈IDi, Qi, bi, ci〉 as explained below. When A queries H1 at an unrepeated IDi, B
generates a random coin ci ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[ci = 0] = δ, and a random
bi ← Z∗p. If ci = 0 it computes Qi = biP2 ∈ G∗2, and if ci = 1 it computes
Qi = biQ ∈ G∗2. Finally, B adds the tuple 〈IDi, Qi, bi, ci〉 to the H list1 and sends
H1(IDi) = Qi to A.
The idea is that tuples with ci = 0 enable B to answer private key queries
for identity IDi, while B can only take profit of A’s advantage when A chooses
a challenge identity IDch such that cch = 1.
Phase 1 - Extraction queries When A asks for the private key associated
to IDi, B runs the algorithm for responding H1-queries and gets H1(IDi) =
Qi, where 〈IDi, Qi, bi, ci〉 is the corresponding entry in H list1 . If ci = 1 then B
aborts the game and the attack against BasicPubhy failed. Otherwise, ci = 0 and
therefore Qi = biP2. It turns out that di can be computed as di := biQpub, since
by definition di = sQi. Finally, B gives di to algorithm A.
Phase 1 - Decryption queries B answers to a decryption query 〈IDi, Ci〉
as follows. It runs H1-queries algorithm and let 〈IDi, Qi, bi, ci〉 ∈ H list1 . If ci =
0, then B retrieves the private key di and decrypts Ci using the decryption
algorithm. If ci = 1, then Qi = biQ. Recall that the unknown private key is
di = sQi = sbiQ. Set C
′
i = 〈biUi, Vi,Wi〉, where Ci = 〈Ui, Vi,Wi〉. Then, the
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authors claim that the Full-Ident decryption of Ci is equal to the BasicPubhy
decryption of C
′
i . The reason given is that
ê(biUi, d) = ê(biUi, sQ) = ê(Ui, sbiQ) = ê(Ui, sQi) = ê(Ui, di),
which implies that the values σ andM obtained by decrypting Ci with Full-Ident
and by decrypting C
′
i with BasicPub
hy are equal. However, BasicPubhy will out-
put the reject symbol when decrypting C
′
i with overwhelming probability. To
see this, remember that biUi = biriP1, and at least bi ← Z∗p, which implies that
bir is uniformly random in Z∗p. On the other hand, we have that H3 is a random
oracle not controlled by B. These facts imply that H3(σ,M) 6= bir with proba-
bility 1 − 1/p, and therefore the decryption algorithm of BasicPubhy will reject
the ciphertext. Thereby, we can not use the decryption oracle for BasicPubhy
to decrypt ciphertexts under any IDi such that H1(IDi) 6= Q. Therefore, the
reduction in [BF03] is not valid.
3.3 Fixing the security reduction
Due to the ciphertext integrity checking in FO transformation [FO99], we can
only answer decryption queries 〈IDi, Ci〉 such that:
– H1(IDi) = biP2, since we can use the private key di, or
– H1(IDi) = Q, since in this case, the decryption of Ci under such IDi is equal
to the decryption of Ci by BasicPubhy.
This remark enables us to fix the flawed reduction shown above. In the fol-
lowing we describe the new answers delivered by B.
Setup As in Section 3.2.
H1-queries Before initializing H list1 , B selects at random j ← {1, . . . , qH1}.
When A queries H1 at IDi, algorithm B proceeds as follows: if i 6= j, it picks
bi ← Z∗p, sets Qi = biP2, adds 〈IDi, Qi, bi〉 to the list and gives back Qi to A.
If i = j, it sets Qj = Q, adds 〈IDi, Qi, *〉 to the list and sends Qj to A. Here *
denotes a special symbol. Note that the outputs of H1 are uniformly distributed
in G∗2 and independent of A′s current view, since Q is unknown to A and is
uniformly distributed in G∗2.
Phase 1 - Extraction queries When A asks for the private key for IDi, B
runs the algorithm for responding H1-queries and gets H1(IDi) = Qi, where
〈IDi, Qi, bi〉 is the corresponding entry in H list1 . If i = j, then B aborts the game
and the attack against BasicPubhy failed. Otherwise, it sets di := biQpub. Finally,
B gives di to algorithm A.
Phase 1 - Decryption queries B answers to a decryption query 〈IDi, Ci〉 as
follows. It runs H1-queries algorithm and let 〈IDi, Qi, bi〉 ∈ H list1 . If i 6= j, then
B retrieves the private key di and decrypts Ci using the decryption algorithm. If
i = j, then Qi = Q, and the decryption of 〈IDj , Cj〉 is the same as the decryption
of Cj under BasicPubhy. Then, B asks its challenger to decrypt Cj and relays
the answer to A.
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Challenge A outputs a public key IDch and two equal length plaintextsM0,M1.
Algorithm B proceeds as follows. If IDch 6= IDj , it aborts the game and the attack
against BasicPubhy failed. Otherwise, it sends M0,M1 to its own challenger and
gets back C, the encryption ofMβ for a random bit β under BasicPubhy. Finally,
B relays C to A, which is an also encryption of Mβ under IDch for Full-Ident.
Phase 2 - Extraction queries Algorithm B proceeds as in Phase 1, except for
the extraction query for IDch, which is rejected.
Phase 2 - Decryption queries Algorithm B proceeds as in Phase 1, except
for the decryption query 〈IDch, Cβ〉, which is rejected.
Guess Algorithm A outputs a guess β′ for β. B outputs β′ as its guess.
Using this algorithm B, we are able to state the following:
Result 4 Let A an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has advantage ε against Full-Ident
making at most qE , qD and qH1 queries. Then there is an IND-CCA adversary B
that has advantage at least εqH1
(
1− qEqH1
)
≈ εqH1 against BasicPub
hy. Its running
time is t2 ≤ t1 + cG2(qD + qH1 + qE), where cG2 denotes the time of computing
a random multiple in G2.
Proof : See Appendix A. uunionsq
Therefore, joining Results 2, 3 and 4, an IND-ID-CCA advantage 1 against
Full-Ident is turned into an algorithm with advantage roughly ε1/(q3H) in solving
the BDH problem. Compared to the original flawed reduction, where the advan-
tage obtained against BDH was roughly ε1/(q2HqD), the new reduction is a bit
worse, since in general qD  qH . In the next section we show a modification of
Full-Ident which allows a tighter security reduction.
4 A new identity based encryption scheme with improved
tightness
In this section we design a new IBE scheme using the scheme Basic-Ident from the
previous section and a second general transformation also due to Fujisaki and
Okamoto [FO00]. This conversion starts from an IND-CPA encryption scheme
and builds an IND-CCA scheme in the ROM. If we denote by Epk(M, r) the
encryption of M using the random bits r under the public key pk, with set
of messages M = {0, 1}n, set of coins R and set of ciphertexts C, the new
transformation is the scheme
EhyNewpk (M) = Epk(M ||r,H(M ||r)) (3)
where M ||r ∈ {0, 1}n−k0 × {0, 1}k0 and H : {0, 1}∗ → R is a hash function.
Then, MhyNew = {0, 1}n−k0 , RhyNew = {0, 1}k0 and ChyNew = C. To decrypt
C, one first obtains M ′||r′ using the original decryption algorithm, and next
checks if Epk(M ′||r′,H(M ′||r′)) = C. If this is so, outputsM ; otherwise outputs
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reject.
Let us describe the new IBE scheme thereby obtained.
NewFull-Ident
Setup. Let (G1,G2, GT , be, ψ) a bilinear group. Choose a genera-
tor P2 ← G2 and set P1 = ψ(P2). Next pick s ← Z∗p and
set Qpub = sP2 ∈ G∗2,Ppub = sP1 ∈ G∗1. Choose hash func-
tions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗2, H2 : GT → {0, 1}n and H3 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. Now M = {0, 1}n−k0 , C = G∗1 × {0, 1}n and
params = 〈p,G1,G2,GT , be, P1, P2, Ppub, Ppub, Qpub, H1, H2, H3〉.
The master-key is s ∈ Z∗p.
Extract. For a given ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute QID = H1(ID) ∈ G∗2 and
set dID = sQID ∈ G∗2 where s is the master key.
Encrypt. To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}n−k0 under ID, compute QID =
H1(ID) ∈ G∗2, choose σ ← {0, 1}k0 , set r = H3(M,σ) ∈ Z∗p and fi-
nally
C = 〈rP1, (M ||σ)⊕H2(grID)〉 where gID = be(Ppub, QID) ∈ GT
Decrypt. Let C = 〈U, V 〉 ∈ C be a ciphertext under the public key
ID. To decrypt C using the private key dID ∈ G∗2 do:
1. Compute V ⊕H2(be(U, dID)) =M ||σ.
2. Parse M ||σ and compute r = H3(M,σ). Check that U = rP. If not,
reject the ciphertext.
4. Output M .
On the basis of the proof sketched in the previous section, we define in a
similar fashion a public key encryption scheme NewBasicPubhy, which is obtained
applying the conversion from expression (3) to Basic-Pub. Then the following
results hold:
Result 5 Let A1 an IND-ID-CCA adversary with advantage ε1 against NewFull-Ident
making at most qE private key extraction queries, qD decryption queries and
qH1 hash queries. Then there is an IND-CCA adversary A2 that has advan-
tage at least εqH1
(
1− qEqH1
)
≈ εqH1 against NewBasicPub
Hy. Its running time
is t2 ≤ t1 + cG1(qD + qH1 + qE).
Proof: Use the same reduction as for Result 4 in Section 3.3.
Result 6 Let A2 an IND-CCA adversary with advantage ε2 against NewBasicPubhy
making at most qD decryption queries and at most qH2 hash queries. Then there
is an IND-CPA adversary A3 that has advantage at least(
ε2 − qH2 · 2−(k0−1)
)(
1− 1
p
)qD
≈ ε2
against BasicPub. Its running time is t3 ≤ t2 + qH2(TBasicPub + log p), where
TBasicPub is the running time of Encrypt algorithm in BasicPub.
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Proof: This result is obtained as a special case of Theorem 5.4 in [FO00].
Finally, taking into account these new reductions, we obtain that NewFull-
Ident scheme is (t1, qH , qD, ε1) IND-ID-CCA secure if the BDH problem on (G1,G2)
is
(
t1 + cG1(2qD + qH) + qHO(log3 p+ log p),
ε1
q2H
)
-secure
The last expression has been simplified replacing any of the hash queries
qHi by qH and setting qD = qE . Then, we get rid of a qH factor in the BDH
advantage with respect to the reduction in expression (2).
Compared to Full-Ident scheme, which is the result of using FO transforma-
tion in expression (1), the NewFull-Ident scheme presents several advantages:
– It provides more compact ciphertexts. In fact, Full-Ident scheme adds a n-bits
component to a Basic-Ident ciphertext to get chosen ciphertext security, while
NewFull-Ident achieves this preserving Basic-Ident ciphertext’s structure.
– It presents a tighter security reduction to the BDH problem.
– It uses one less hash function than Full-Ident.
We can obtain a second tightness improvement using a stronger assumption,
namely, the BDDH assumption. In this case, we have the following result:
Result 7 Let A3 an IND-CPA adversary that has advantage ε3 against BasicPub
making at most qH2 hash queries. Then there is an algorithm B breaking the
BDDH problem on (G1,G2) with advantage roughly ε3 and running time t′ ≈ t3.
Proof : See Appendix B. uunionsq
With this second tightness improvement, we obtain that NewFull-Ident scheme
is (t1, qH , qD, ε1) IND-ID-CCA secure if the BDDH problem on (G1,G2) is(
t1 + cG1(2qD + qH) + qHO(log3 q + log q),
ε1
qH
)
-secure
Then, we get rid of a qH factor in the security reduction at the cost of relying
on a stronger assumption.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we have shown there is a flawed step in the security reduction ex-
hibited in [BF03] for the so called Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme. We have provided
a new reduction without modifying the original scheme neither the underlying
hard problem used to state the security.
In the second place, we have proposed a new IBE scheme slightly changing
the original scheme. The proposal presents a tighter reduction than BF scheme,
uses one less random oracle and has more compact ciphertexts.
11
Finally, we point out that it is still an open problem to design an IND-ID-
CCA IBE scheme with a tight security reduction under a reasonable assumption
either in the standard or the random oracle models.
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A Proof of Result 4
If algorithm B does not abort during the simulation, A’s view is identical to its
view in a real attack: H1 behaves as random oracle, and extraction as well as
12
decryption queries are valid. Therefore, |Pr[β′ = β]− 1/2| ≥ ε, where this prob-
ability is over the random bits of A,B and the challenger for the IND-ID-CCA
game.
It remains to bound the probability Pr[B does not abort]. The algorithm
can abort for two reasons: (1) it is asked in Phase 1 for the private key query
corresponding to IDj , or (2) the challenge identity IDch 6= IDj . Note that B can
not abort in Phase 2, since in this case A is not allowed to query the private key
for IDj = IDch. Let E1 be the event that B aborts due to (1), and define E2 in
the obvious way.
Then, Pr[B does not abort] = Pr[¬E1 ∧ ¬E2] = Pr[¬E2|¬E1] Pr[¬E1].
We can upper bound for Pr[E1] ≤ qE/qH , which is the probability that A
makes a extraction query for IDj in Phase 1, since the maximum number of such
queries is qE .
On the other hand, a lower bound for Pr[¬E2|¬E1], that is the probability
that A chooses IDj as the challenge identity, is 1/qH1 . Therefore,
Pr[B does not abort] ≥ 1
qH1
(
1− qE
qH1
)
.
This shows that B′s advantage is at least
ε
qH1
(
1− qE
qH1
)
.
uunionsq
B Proof of Result 7
Algorithm B receives as inputs the bilinear group (G1,G2), and a random in-
stance (P2, aP2, bP2, cP1, T ) from either PBDH or RBDH distributions. Then B
uses A IND-CPA advantage against BasicPub to distinguish PBDH from RBDH .
Setup B providesA with the public key pk = 〈p,G1,G2,GT , ê, P1, P2, Ppub, Qpub, Q,H2〉,
where P1 = ψ(P2), Qpub = aP2, Ppub = ψ(Qpub), Q = bP2 and H2 is a random
oracle controlled by B as explained below. Notice that the unknown private key
of BasicPub is d = abP2.
H2-queries To respond A queries to H2, B maintains a list H list2 of tuples
〈Xi,Hi〉. When queried with Xi, algorithm B does the following:
1. If 〈Xi,Hi〉 ∈ H list2 , it returns H2(Xi) = Hi.
2. Otherwise, B picks Hi ← {0, 1}n, adds the tuple 〈Xi,Hi〉 to the list and
returns H2(Xi) = Hi.
Challenge A outputs two equal length plaintexts M0,M1 in which it wishes to
be challenged. Algorithm B returns as the challenge ciphertext C = 〈cP1,Mβ ⊕
H2(T )〉, where β ← {0, 1}.
Guess A eventually outputs a guess β′ for β. Algorithm B returns 1 if β′ = β
and 0 otherwise.
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Algorithm B is simulating a real attack environment for A. If the random
instance is from RBDH , then Pr[β′ = β] = 1/2, since in this case the distribution
of the ciphertext C is independent of the bit β. Otherwise, the instance comes
from PBDH , C is a valid encryption of Mβ and therefore Pr[β′ = β] = 1/2 + ε
by definition of A. Therefore,
|Pr[B(PBDH) = 1]− Pr[B(RBDH) = 1]| = |1/2 + ε− 1/2| = ε.
uunionsq
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